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THE BENEFITS OF MORTALITY
RISK REDUCTION:
HAPPINESS SURVEYS VS.
THE VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE
W. KIP VISCUSI†
A principal component of many benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) of
health, safety, and environmental regulations is the valuation of the
fatality risk effects of the underlying policy. Government agencies
currently value these expected effects using estimates of the value of a
statistical life (VSL), that is, the tradeoff rate between money and
very small risks of death. This measure corresponds to BCA’s
theoretically appropriate benefits measure, which is society’s
willingness to pay for the risk reduction. Here, I will review the VSL
approach, compare it to suggested alternatives that use happiness
measures of well-being, and address some of the misunderstandings
that may be contributing to some researchers’ advocacy for the use of
happiness scores for policy valuation. The VSL serves as a focal point
of the well-being analysis by Professors John Bronsteen, Christopher
1
Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur (Bronsteen et al.). As VSL is the
fatality risks-benefits measure conventionally used in BCA, it also
generally serves as a principal reference point for guiding publicpolicy valuations, which are the focus of Professor Matthew Adler’s
2
article.
A common approach to estimating VSL is the use of wage
3
premiums that workers receive for occupational fatality risks. It is
† University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management, Vanderbilt
University.
1. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1670–79 (2013) (discussing VSL’s
limitations and possible alternative measures).
2. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1509 (2013).
3. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING
MORTALITY RISK REDUCTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A WHITE PAPER 35–43 (2010),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0563-1.pdf/$file/EE-0563-1.pdf
(examining hedonic wage studies used to determine VSL); Memorandum from Polly
Trottenberg, Under Sec’y for Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., & Robert Rivkin, Gen. Counsel,
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to the Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs of the U.S. Dep’t of Transp.
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instructive to start with the theoretical underpinnings of VSL in this
context, which in turn indicate the nature of the relationship of the
components of the VSL calculation to individual utility. The empirical
estimate of VSL based on wage-risk tradeoffs is the difference
between one’s utility when alive and when dead, divided by the
4
expected marginal utility of income. Thus, a key building block of the
formula is a measure of how great one’s utility, or well-being, is when
alive as compared to how great one’s utility is when deceased, which
also might be thought of as one’s bequest. The utility functions in this
analysis are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions that are
conditional on health status and are generally defined only up to a
5
positive linear transformation. Adding a constant to the utility
functions or multiplying the utility functions by a positive constant
does not alter their structure, but it does affect their level. To give the
difference in utility functions cardinal significance, the formula for
VSL divides the difference in utilities by the expected marginal utility
of income, which serves to normalize the units of the utility-difference
expression. As a consequence of this mathematical structure, VSL
serves as a cardinal measure of preferences with respect to fatality
risks. For small changes in the risk of death, VSL is a measure of both
the worker’s willingness-to-pay value for reduced risk and
willingness-to-accept value for increased risk. Government agencies
have used the individual valuations of risk implied by estimates of
6
VSL to value society’s willingness to pay for the risk reduction.
Although happiness scores elicited in surveys are not tantamount
to utility levels, many researchers have advocated them as measures
of well-being. However, unlike the VSL formulation, well-being
measures have no explicit economic content and no cardinal

(Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance%
202013.pdf (utilizing VSL estimates calculated by wage-premium studies). Examples of the VSL
estimates used in policy contexts appear in W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluation of Life, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 103, 107 (2009).
4. E.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review
of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 7–8 (2003).
5. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 173–74 (7th prtg. 2009).
6. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 114 tbl.2 (providing 27 examples of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) using VSL); id. at 108 tbl.1 (providing 13 examples of uses of the VSL
by other agencies). For general agency guidance on using VSL in policy evaluation, see OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY
ANALYSIS, at 29–31 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
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significance. A representative well-being survey question asks the
respondent to rate his or her happiness or satisfaction with life on a
7
numerical scale such as 0 to 10, 1 to 10, or 1 to 7. At a most
fundamental level, how should a person even think about such a
question? What is the reference point for such an assessment? Should
the assessment depend on today’s weather, how this week compares
to last week, or how happy one would be in a world without budget
constraints? If you have a permanent disability, then you may
nevertheless feel pretty good about how your life is going on a
particular day, but you might be much happier if you were not
disabled—and you would give a different happiness score if the nodisability state were in the reference set. A similar reference-point
issue affecting this thought experiment is whether people compare
their well-being on a relative basis to others, and if so, how people
8
construct this comparison set. A person in Liberia with an income of
one dollar per day would be in the top 15 percent of that population’s
income distribution and may have a relatively high happiness score
when answering the question in comparison to fellow Liberians. If,
however, the comparison is relative to the well-being in more affluent
countries or based on some absolute metric, the person might
recalibrate the index and give a different score. These incomparability
and reference-point problems undermine the validity of international
comparisons of well-being across countries and also lead to
9
underestimation of the effect of income on happiness.
In addition to lacking any theoretical grounding or mechanisms
by which people can conceptualize the appropriate response to a wellbeing question, such scales are an inappropriate basis for benefit
assessment for a variety of reasons. Happiness scores share the

7. See Richard R. Layard, G. Mayraz & S. Nickell, The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J.
PUB. ECON. 1846, 1848 tbl.1 (2008) (collecting examples of well-being studies). See generally
Adler, supra note 2 (presenting representative survey texts and providing a review and critique
of such questions).
8. Such relative comparisons are fraught with error, as shown by Professors Thomas J.
Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, Why Relative Economic Position Does Not Matter: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9–19 (2003).
9. The lack of comparability of U.S. and Dutch scales and the underestimation of the
effect of income on happiness are documented in Arie Kapteyn, James P. Smith & Arthur Van
Soest, Are Americans Really Less Happy with Their Incomes?, 59 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 44
(2013).
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10

inherent inadequacies of ordinal measures. Consider an example of
ranking the members of a basketball team in terms of height where 5
is the score for the tallest player and 1 is the score for the shortest
player. Unless the tallest player is 5 times taller than the shortest
player, the scale cannot serve as a cardinal measure. For much the
same reasons, if the scale is to have cardinal significance, moving
from 10 to 8 on the subjective well-being scale should be twice as
valuable as moving from 8 to 7 and have the same value as moving
from 3 to 1. What “twice as valuable” even means cannot be tested
because there is no external metric to assess the well-being level that
corresponds to a particular happiness score.
For the scales to have meaning, the intervals for different
respondents must represent identical welfare effects across people.
Such an intractable, interpersonal comparison problem does not arise
in benefit assessments based on monetary willingness-to-pay
amounts. Bronsteen et al. claim that interpersonal comparisons under
BCA are not possible if compensation is not paid to the policy losers
11
following the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion. However, this is
an irrelevant point that simply is not true. The monetary valuations of
the winners and losers can be compared under BCA. For a policy for
which the benefits exceed the costs, the gainers from the policy can
potentially compensate the losers and still be better off than before.
But unless compensation is actually paid to the losers, the possibility
of a potential compensation scheme that can make the losers no
worse off than before is not morally compelling. As a practical
matter, there will be winners and losers from almost all government
policies, but the entire portfolio of government policies, including tax
policies, may address distributional inequities. Even under a social
well-being approach, some people will experience an increase in wellbeing and others will experience a decrease such that unless
compensation is paid to all the losers, there is a problem of violating
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. But unlike the VSL approach, the use of
well-being measures creates the additional problem of not having any
sound basis to compare the effects to those who benefit from the
policy and those who do not.

10. Ordinal measures also cannot be used in the same manner as cardinal variables in
regression contexts or for policy assessments. Professor Adler also discusses this problem. See
Adler, supra note 2, at 1590–92.
11. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 1, at 1670–79 (discussing VSL’s
limitations and possible alternative measures).
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The well-being scales are also very coarse. There are very few
government policies that would alter people’s well-being by an entire
point, which corresponds to a welfare effect of about 10 percent,
depending on the scale being used. The only example of a policy that
substantially affected my well-being was the institution of a draft
lottery from 1969 to 1972 during the Vietnam War. Prior to the
lottery system, college students were subject to the draft only after
graduating. With the lottery system, college students’ birthdays were
drawn at random and assigned a lottery number. Those with
favorable lottery numbers, such as myself, were assigned a lower
priority in the draft and were exempted from military service. Few
government policies have such life-changing consequences. Given the
myriad of government policies that exist, perhaps the elimination of
programs associated with an entire executive-branch agency would
not alter one’s well-being score. This coarseness makes the well-being
score approach of little help for assessing diverse policy outcomes,
few of which are truly life-changing.
Rating scales such as those used in well-being studies also are
bounded from above and below. If I am having a bad day, I might say
that this is a 0, but is that score the same as being dead? And if 0 is
the worst outcome, is having a bad day as undesirable from a welfare
standpoint as being captured and tortured by terrorists? Similarly, at
the upper-end of the scale, a good day that merits a score of 8 gives
one very little room for improvement. A middle-income person with
a starting point score of 8 might be considerably happier if given Bill
Gates’s entire fortune, but a 10-point happiness index limits the jump
in well-being to 2 points. Any study that imposes an upper bound on
the well-being score may lead to an erroneous conclusion that money
does not increase happiness to a great extent. The numerical ordinal
scale for happiness creates ceiling and floor effects, whereas there is
no such limitation associated with conventional willingness-to-pay or
willingness-to-accept measures used in BCA.
The manner in which the well-being proponents would value
lives is as follows: adhering to the approach that Bronsteen et al.
advocate, if one has a constant well-being score throughout one’s life,
the benefit value is the happiness score multiplied by the remaining
12
life expectancy, and there is no discounting of the values. A newborn
baby with a life expectancy of eighty years consequently is eighty
times as valuable as an elderly person with one remaining expected
12. Id. at 1663–64.
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year of life. Similarly, a policy that extends the life of an elderly
person with a well-being score of 7 by one more year would have the
same value as letting that elderly person die and making seven people
a bit happier by raising their scores from 6 to 7 for one year.
In addition to the questionable linearity assumption, the wellbeing approach makes no allowance for the role of probabilistic
effects. VSL provides measures for one’s expected death in situations
in which there are small risks of death. In contrast, the well-being
value of 7 for the elderly person in the example above is the pertinent
value whether it is an identified life that is being extended with
certainty or whether it is one expected life that is being saved as the
result of a reduction in a small probability of the risk of death. Unlike
the insensitivity to the probability of death of the well-being unitvalue approach, society generally accords quite different values to
identified lives and statistical lives, as do the individuals facing the
risk of death.
The absence of discounting in the Bronsteen et al. formulation of
the well-being value of lives is also problematic. They give an
example of a person who has a well-being score of 7.4 for thirty years,
leading to a well-being value of that person’s life of 30 × 7.4, or
13
222.48. In a world in which there is no discounting, as in their
example, the well-being value of a life is unchanged if the life saved is
deferred, such as by an anti-cancer policy that reduces risks after a
decade-long latency period. More remote policy impacts also are
accorded the same value. The value of extending the life of someone
who will be alive one hundred years from now has the same value as
an immediate life extension of the same duration. In a world in which
it is possible to invest and earn interest, then, in the absence of
discounting, if the cost of reducing death risks is constant, it will
always be desirable to postpone lifesaving efforts. This is because one
can invest current resources, save more future lives, and generate
more well-being units instead of allocating funds to save lives now.
The misunderstandings of Bronsteen et al. also extend to their
discussion of VSL methodology. They express dismay that there is
14
substantial heterogeneity of the VSL. But VSL is not a universal
constant such as e or π. People will differ in their risk/money tradeoffs

13. Id. at 1642.
14. See id. at 1652 (“[T]he fact that rich and poor people (who presumably care equally, or
at least comparably, about staying alive) would be willing to pay vastly different amounts to
avoid a 1-in-10,000 risk of death illustrates the inadequacy of [BCA] for valuing lives.”).
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in much the same way as they differ in preferences for other
economic goods. Empirical estimates using VSL have a median value
of $7 million (in year 2000 dollars) based on my meta-analysis with
15
Professor Joseph Aldy. There is considerable heterogeneity in the
VSL because the populations in the studies differ in many
fundamental respects, such as age and wealth. There also may be
differences in econometric methodology because the studies vary in
quality in this field as in other areas of economic inquiry. The risk
data used in these studies has also improved over time, and as a
result, the estimates using the new Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries data tend to involve less measurement error and are in a
16
narrower range than in previous studies. The VSL estimates used by
government agencies from 1996 to 2008 have ranged from $6.8
million to $9 million (in year 2008 dollars) per expected life saved at
17
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and have been
18
around $6.2 million (in year 2008 dollars) at several other agencies.
Some agencies are considering updating their assessments using more
recent fatality rate data.
Bronsteen et al., as well as other commentators, are disturbed
that there are wealth effects that influence the VSL because more
19
affluent individuals have a higher VSL. This dependence on wealth
is not a drawback but is an attractive property that is consistent with a
more general positive income elasticity of health. Indeed, one might
well question the validity of any well-being scale that did not exhibit a
positive relationship to financial resources. Greater wealth enlarges
one’s choice set, and enlarging one’s choice set should always raise
well-being because a person always has the option of not spending the
money or giving it away.
There are three noteworthy observations with respect to wealth
effects and VSL, which I first linked to wage-risk tradeoffs over three
decades ago. First, more affluent people are willing to invest more in

15. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 4, at 18.
16. The Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries is a comprehensive census of all job-related
fatalities. See Joyce M. Northwood, Eric F. Sygnatur & Janice A. Windau, Updated BLS
Occupational Injury and Illness Classification System, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 2012, at 19,
19. The narrowing of the estimated range of VSL estimates is discussed in Thomas J. Kniesner,
W. Kip Viscusi, Christopher Woock & James P. Ziliak, The Value of a Statistical Life: Evidence
from Panel Data, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 74, 85–86 (2012).
17. See Viscusi, supra note 3, at 114 tbl.2.
18. See id. at 108 tbl.1.
19. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 1, at 1652.
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risk reduction than are poorer people and are less willing to boost
20
their income with earnings from a potentially dangerous job. As a
result, more affluent people have a higher VSL than less affluent
people. Such heterogeneity in preferences is manifested in consumer
choices; for example, more expensive automobiles often come
equipped with very expensive safety features that would not be
attractive to purchasers of more basic automobiles. Requiring that all
cars have the same safety features as an $80,000 car would lower the
welfare of the purchasers of inexpensive cars. Second,
notwithstanding the theoretical and empirical variation in VSL with
wealth, I know of no instances in which government agencies have
21
assigned different VSL levels to people in different income groups.
By using a uniform VSL across different populations, agencies engage
in an implicit form of income redistribution, as benefits to the poor
receive a greater weight than is justified by their VSL and benefits to
the rich are undervalued. The principal exception to this uniformity is
that agencies adjust the VSL over time for increases in societal
22
income levels. Third, even though government agencies do not make
income-based distinctions in setting the VSL, I advocate doing so,
particularly in situations in which the beneficiaries of the policy are,
in effect, paying for the greater level of safety—for example, airline
passengers who must pay a higher ticket price for travel on planes
23
subject to expensive safety regulations.
Because lifesaving efforts do not convey immortality, the age
variation of VSL has been a major area of economic inquiry.
24
Contrary to the claims by Bronsteen et al., there is no barrier to
recognizing age variations in VSL in a BCA. However, as a practical
matter, agencies seldom do so. Early empirical estimates of the VSL-

20. The positive income elasticity of VSL is documented by Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 4,
at 36–43.
21. The EPA and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) guidance documents and
the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4 mentioned above make no provision for
recognizing differences across income groups, though adjustments for increases in societal
income levels over time are allowed. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., supra note 3, at 10–11;
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 6, at 30; Memorandum from Tyler D. Duvall & D.J.
Gribbin, supra note 3, at 1.
22. The DOT adopted the income elasticity estimates based on an article by Professors
Viscusi and Aldy. Memorandum from Tyler D. Duvall & D.J. Gribbin, supra note 3, at 3–4; see
also Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 4.
23. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK 28–29 (1992).
24. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 1, at 1677–79.
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25

age variation found a steadily declining pattern with age, in part
because available fatality-rate data did not permit a more refined
analysis. More recent studies using age-specific fatality rates by
industry and occupation have generated evidence that there is an
inverted U-shaped relationship between the VSL and age, consistent
with economic theory and the rise and fall of individual income over
26
the life cycle. VSL does taper off with age, but the VSL for sixty27
year-olds remains higher than that of twenty-year-olds. Similarly, the
value of a statistical life year (VSLY) rises and falls over the life
28
cycle. Procedures that assume a constant value per year of life such
as the well-being approach and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)
consequently are not accurate reflections of age-related variations in
willingness-to-bear risks.
Despite the prominence of age-related studies in the literature,
government agencies have rarely incorporated age adjustments into
VSL. A notable exception is the EPA’s Clear Skies Initiative, in
which the EPA included in a sensitivity analysis a 37 percent senior
29
discount for those over age seventy. This incident generated
substantial controversy, particularly among senior citizen groups, and
government agencies subsequently have not made age adjustments. I
believe the resistance would be even greater to the well-being unit
approach because that methodology makes the valuation of lives a
linear function of remaining life expectancy, leading to a much
greater senior discount than in the EPA study.
The estimates of the VSL based on labor-market risks largely
pertain to acute risks of death, but the VSL approach is not restricted
to such risks. The literature has addressed a wide variety of risks that
affect wages, prices, or stated willingness-to-pay values in surveys.
Consider two of the most prominently featured alleged omissions:
cancer and deaths from terrorist attacks. First, are VSL estimates
pertinent for cancer cases, which involve morbidity effects different
25. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 4, at 50–53 (noting that most early studies estimated a
value per life year, which will lead to a lower VSL for older people, who have shorter remaining
life expectancy).
26. E.g., Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for Age
and Cohort Effects, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 573 (2008).
27. See id. at 580 (“While this value is below the peak VSL over the life cycle, these older
workers’ VSLs are above the VSLs for very young workers.”).
28. Id.
29. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE
BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES INITIATIVE 35–36 (2002), available at http://www.epa.
gov/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf.
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from those for acute job accidents? The VSL literature can and has
evaluated cancer risks. I have been involved in three such studies, one
of which involved imputing the VSL based on the effect on housing
prices of cancer risks from hazardous waste sites, and the other two
30
studies were stated-preference studies. The EPA funded two of
these studies, and has proposed using a cancer premium of 50 percent
31
while it refines estimates of the pertinent VSL level for cancer.
Second, can the VSL methodology address differences in the
valuation of risks of death from terrorism? Such deaths are bundled
with national security concerns and may be valued differently than
other fatality risks. I have found that terrorism risks are valued twice
32
as highly as deaths from natural disasters. As the terrorism and
cancer examples indicate, there is no barrier to generalizing the VSL
approach to different kinds of deaths.
Finally, some of the reservations of Bronsteen et al. with respect
to VSL are regarding the details of the estimation. They worry that
workers may not know their job risks or be able to think sensibly
33
about small risks. But thinking about actual job risks when a worker
can observe working conditions and job injuries is quite different
from valuing hypothetical risks in a survey context. The empirical
results in the VSL literature are very similar using objective and
34
subjective risk measures. If the measurement error is random, it will
tend to bias the estimates downward. However, the robustness of the
results to various instrumental-variables estimates, which is an
econometric approach that addresses potential measurement error,
suggests that with the current available fatality-rate data this is not a
35
major concern.
30. Ted Gayer, James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Private Values of Risk Tradeoffs at
Superfund Sites: Housing Market Evidence on Learning About Risk, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 439
(2000); Wesley A. Magat, W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber, A Reference Lottery Metric for Valuing
Health, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1118 (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Joel Huber & Jason Bell, Assessing Whether
There Is a Cancer Premium for the Value of a Statistical Life, 22 HEALTH ECON. (forthcoming
2013).
31. NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., supra note 3, at 25–26.
32. W. Kip Viscusi, Valuing Risks of Death from Terrorism and Natural Disasters, 38 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 191, 203 (2009). I am currently refining these estimates under a contract
for the University of Southern California’s CREATE project funded by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.
33. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 1, at 1649 (“People’s minds are not
designed to differentiate between exceedingly small risks and infinitesimally small risks, and
when asked to do so rationally, they frequently fail.”).
34. Some of these comparisons are discussed in Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 4, at 10, 65 n.5.
35. For a diverse series of econometric tests, see Kniesner et al., supra note 16, at 78–85.
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Both VSL and BCA remain generally accepted methodologies
among economists and government agencies. They serve a valuable
function in enabling government agencies to assess and compare the
performance of government policies. Happiness and well-being
studies may have a useful role to play in the psychology-andeconomics literature generally, but given the current state of research
in the area, they do not provide either an alternative or a
supplementary methodology for policy assessment.

